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Centre de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion (CREG)
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Antoine RenucciProfesseur des Universités, Agrégé de Sciences de Gestion

  • Parcours
  • Responsabilités
  • Thèmes de recherche
  • Publications

Parcours

Docteur en Finance de l’Université de Toulouse 1-Capitole, diplômé du programme Grandes Ecoles de l’E.M. Lyon, Antoine Renucci enseigne la Finance à l’Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour sur le site de Bayonne, à l’Université Paris-Dauphine et en Master 2 Recherche Finance and Economics, programme commun de l'ENS Lyon, l'EM Lyon et l'Université Lyon 2.

Antoine Renucci a publié ses recherches dans le Journal of Corporate Finance, Review of Finance, Oxford Economic Papers, Bankers, Markets and Investors, Politiques et Management Public, .... Il est ad hoc referee pour le Journal of Financial Intermediation, Annals of Finance, European Financial Management Journal, the Review of Economic Studies, Finance, Management Science, Revue Economique, the International Review of Economics and Finance, the Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Questions de management. Il dirige l'équipe de Recherche Etudes Comparatives en Management (ECM).

Il mène ou a mené une activité de consultant auprès d’Euro MTS (plate-forme électronique de trading de titres de dette souveraine), la Banque Populaire (SPEF), l’IRDI, Dassault Aviation, la Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, HRA Pharma, ...

Son engagement dans la communauté scientifique et économique s’est traduit par son rôle d’administrateur de l’European Financial Management association, d’expert auprès de l’Agence Nationale de la Recherche, auprès du Conseil d’Analyse Economique du Premier Ministre (CAE), du Haut Conseil de l'Evaluation de la Recherche et de l'Enseignement Supérieur.

Il est ou a été membre du Conseil Scientifique de l’Université, du Conseil d'Orientation Stratégique de l'Université, du Conseil d’Administration de l’IAE et du Conseil du Collège Etudes Européennes et Internationales.

Antoine Renucci est Directeur Exécutif d'Entrepreneuriat Campus Aquitaine.

Responsabilités

Directeur Exécutif d'Entrepreneuriat Campus Aquitaine (ECA)

Chargé de Mission Entrepreneuriat auprès du Président de la Communauté d'Universités d'Aquitaine (CUEA)

Responsable de l'équipe de Recherche ECM (Etudes Comparatives en Management)

Responsable du Parcours Recherche de l'IAE de Pau-Bayonne

Responsable du Master 2 Chargé de Clientèle, Banque et Assurance

Thèmes de recherche

Capital-risque, finance d'entreprise, organisation de l'entreprise, entrepreneuriat

Publications

  • Access to Credit, Rents, and Organization of the Firm”, (Antoine Renucci - Journal of Corporate Finance, 2008, vol. 14, n°4. (Rang 2 CNRS))

    This paper provides a theory for the choice of an organizational structure by the headquarters of a unitary structure concerned about overload. The headquarters can avoid overload by delegating operational decisions to divisions, i.e., moving the firm to a multidivisional structure. We show that, under moral hazard, these divisions receive rents for incentive purposes, and that the multidivisional structure is able to invest more. Thus, there is a trade-off between increasing investment and paying rents. We also show that this trade-off applies to situations where firms consider engaging in acquisitions and joint ventures, or where entrepreneurs consider resorting to venture capitalists.

    Télécharger la version éléctronique (53b6eb3ba7e481a6867506775098a9554149.pdf - 269 Ko)

    Voir la publication en ligne

  • Reputation capital, financial capital and entrepreneurship”, (Antoine Renucci - Frédéric Loss, Oxford Economic Papers 65, 352-371 (Rang 2 CNRS), 2013)

    About 90% of entrepreneurs in the high-tech and professional service industries were previously employed in the same sector. In this paper, we provide a theory for how aspiring entrepreneurs choose an employer. We contrast ‘transparent’ employers (or firms) promoting personal accountability and employee empowerment with ‘opaque’ employers emphasizing team work and down-playing individual accomplishment. Markets use transparent firms' output to a larger extent to update employees' reputation since this output is more informative about individual talent. This has three effects. First, it harms employees who could become entrepreneurs if their reputation was maintained, but benefits the others. Second, it fosters effort, which raises wages, and thus the financial capital available to start a venture. Third, the perspective of entrepreneurship can induce employees to exert excessive effort, an effect that transparency exacerbates. We show that intermediate-reputation employees choose opaque firms, whereas higher- and lower-reputation employees choose transparent firms. Empirical implications follow.

    Voir la publication en ligne

  • Bargaining with venture capitalists: When should entrepreneurs show their financial muscle ? (Antoine Renucci - Review of Finance, 2014, vol. 18, 2197-2214. (Rang 1 CNRS))

    In this paper, I model bargaining between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist over the profits from an investment project. I show that, conditional on venture capital being available, more personal wealth, even if it is not invested in the project, helps the entrepreneur capture a larger fraction of the profits. I also show that access to bank financing can preclude access to venture capital. This occurs when bank financing works as a lever that raises the fraction of the profits the entrepreneur demands up to a level that is not incentive compatible with initiative from the venture capitalist.

    Télécharger la version éléctronique (RoF-ms2147-f.pdf - 569 Ko)

    Voir la publication en ligne

  • Making Partner (Antoine Renucci - Frédéric Loss, 2018 (forthcoming), Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Rang 2 CNRS))

    Associates need reputation and financial resources to make partner at law firms, consultancies or venture capital organizations. We provide a theory for how the prospect of making partner influences the business risk they take and their execution effort. In our model, business risk affects (i) how reputation evolves and (ii) the benchmark reputation for making partner through the impact of execution effort on the financial resources accumulated. Our results invalidate some intuitions. We show that preserving their reputation can lead good-reputation professionals to take on high business risk; the prospect of making partner can decrease effort incentives; the fact that business risk strategies are observable does not necessarily change behavior.

    Télécharger la version éléctronique (scandifin3.pdf - 263 Ko)

  • Promotions, Hazards, and Effort (Antoine Renucci - Frédéric Loss, 2018)

    In this paper, we show that a standard result of the career concerns literature (e.g., Holmström, 1982/1999) is not robust to the case of promotions. Specifically, we demonstrate that effort can increase when output is garbled by more extraneous noise. We investigate the implication of this result for the functioning of the firm. Contrary to immediate intuition, we show that managers whose ability is thought to be high can rationally choose projects which are highly informative about ability. We also show that employers and employees play a cat and mouse game in which employers may choose to make output little informative about employees' ability.

    Télécharger la version éléctronique (promotion-jan18.pdf - 413 Ko)